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1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents some reflections on the personal 
appropriation of ICT by immigrants, inspired by an empirical 
study with international immigrants in Spain26. Our research brief 
was to explore the potential of Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT) to promote cultural diversity in the European 
Union (EU). In particular, our team focused on the case study of the 
country of Spain, while other teams considered France, Germany 
and the United Kingdom. Within this framework, our main concerns 
have been with the social and economic participation of immigrant 
and ethnic minorities (IEMs) and their integration. To this end, we 
considered three communities in two autonomous regions of Spain: 
the first case in Catalonia, of Romanians and Bulgarians living in 
Barcelona and the second and third in Andalucía, of Ecuadorians 
in Vera, Almeria province and of Argentineans and other foreign 
nationals residing in Tarifa, Cadiz province. 
Our first task was to explore the supply and demand of ICT services 
amongst our communities of interest and next we compiled a case 
study report for the country. With respect to the evolution of our 
research, while the use of locutorios by Ecuadorians in Vera can be 
compared to that of online resources by Romanians and Bulgarians 
in Barcelona and demonstrates some convergence, the case 
study of Tarifa has diverged. In the first two cases, the research 
methodology is similar and the focus of interest occurs at the 
communal level, whereas in the third case, the use of questionnaires 
and in-depth interviews places its focus at the personal level. A 
brief note on Tarifa may help to contextualize the current chapter. 
The fieldwork with immigrants from different nationalities has led us 
to realize the importance of individual similarities and differences 
in coming to appropriate ICT. Both the individual/personal and 
social/communal axes of analysis appear necessary to address our 
overarching topic adequately, especially since ICT is simultaneously 
26   This chapter is based in the project “The potential of ICT for the promotion 
of cultural diversity: the case of socio-economic integration of immigrants and 
ethnic minorities” (SI-024/08). Tender nº J04/18/2007. Institute for Prospective 
Technological Studies, European Commission’s Joint Research Centre.  (Ver 
Maya-Jariego, 2009; y Maya-Jariego et al., 2009).
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a social and a personal phenomenon. Hence, our ‘microscopic’ 
findings and proposals based on inter-personal comparisons serve 
to complement our more ‘macroscopic’ inter-communal, societal 
investigations.
Given that within the umbrella of ICT and the promotion of cultural 
diversity we are targeting the economic and social participation 
and integration of immigrants, we felt it necessary to consider 
approaches to well-being. In this regard, we attend to Amartya Sen, 
who criticizes the splitting off of economics from ethics. He notes 
that in ‘ethical calculation’, we can conceive of the person dually, 
as follows: 
“in terms of agency, recognizing and respecting his or her ability 
to form goals, commitments, values, etc., and we can also see the 
person in terms of well-being, which too calls for attention…once 
that straitjacket of self-interested motivation is removed, it becomes 
possible to give recognition to the indisputable fact that the person’s 
agency can well be geared to considerations not covered- or at 
least not fully covered- by his or her own well-being.”27
This statement is highly significant, for with it Sen diagnoses a 
major problem with mainstream ‘utility-based welfarist economics’, 
namely, that it ignores agency.28 Given that agency and well-being 
are interdependent, Sen will opt to focus on the former. 
In recognizing the importance of this achievement, Deneulin et 
al. observe that “the underlining philosophical intuition behind 
Sen’s work is that the standard of living lies in the living and not 
in the consumption of commodities.”29 The result is his “capability 
approach” to human well-being, which Martha Nussbaum has 
since developed by itemizing a normative list of so-called “central 
human capabilities” and which we shall now gloss. 
27   1987. On ethics and economics. 41.  
28   Sen, 1987:43-45.
29   Deneulin et al, 2006:1.
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2. PARTICIPATION: THROUGH THE LENSE OF AMARTYA 
SEN’S CAPABILITY APPROACH
In Development as Freedom, Sen notes that economic unfreedom 
“can breed social unfreedom, just as social or political unfreedom 
can also foster economic unfreedom.”30 This would seem to be the 
case especially amongst communities of newly arrived immigrants 
or ethnic minorities, who are not only restricted in their freedoms 
but also subjected to poverty, that is, poverty according to Sen’s 
own definition, namely, “a deprivation of basic capabilities, rather 
than merely…low income.”31 
In the light of poverty as “unfreedom”, then, Sen chooses to focus 
on freedom, the exercise of which, “is mediated by values, but 
the values in turn are influenced by public discussions and social 
interactions, which are themselves influenced by participatory 
freedoms.”32 It is for this reason that he promotes the use of public 
policy to advance human capabilities, which he sees as inter-
related, instrumental freedoms. Likewise, he advocates the use of 
participatory capabilities by the public to direct public policy. This 
dialectical relationship is regarded as central to his now-famous 
‘capability approach’, which Sabina Akire sums as follows: “social 
arrangements should be evaluated according to the extent of 
freedom people have to promote or achieve objectives they value” 
and moreover, “policy-makers should aim to equalize the capability 
each has to enjoy valuable activities and states of being.”33
In terms of the capability approach itself, Sen targets ‘functionings’, 
namely, the various things a person values being or doing. He 
regards these as more appropriate to assess social welfare than 
utility since, following Aristotle, he claims that functionings are 
constitutive of personal being.34 An exclusive focus on functionings 
is counterproductive, however, as Akire notes, because it does 
not consider freedom, or agency, as Sen conceives of it. Hence, 
30   Sen, 1999:8.
31   Sen, 1999:20.
32   Sen, 1999:9.
33   Alkire, 2002. Valuing freedoms. 4. 
34   Alkire, 2002:5.
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capabilities connote the freedom of a person or a group to promote 
or achieve valuable functionings. 
Capability can therefore be defined as, “a set of vectors of 
functionings, reflecting the person’s freedom to lead one type of life 
or another”, that is to say, the freedom to choose between different 
possibilities. Here, freedom refers to the “real opportunity that we 
have to accomplish what we value”;35 in other words a life of volition 
rather than duress. As Nicolas Savogsky observes, “the freedom to 
enjoy primary goods is empty unless there is a real opportunity to 
convert that freedom into well-being. This is precisely why Sen’s 
preferred term is ‘capabilities’ rather than, say, freedoms or rights.”36 
Akire notes that “at an operational level the single most important 
function of the capability approach is to make explicit some implicit 
assumptions in the basic needs approach about the value of choice 
and participation (and the disvalue of coercion).”37 Furthermore, it 
“requires that changes in basic needs be valued with respect to the 
freedom of the same people whose needs are being affected.”38 
One of the truly valuable innovations of the capability approach 
appears to be that it allows alternative possibilities to become 
plausible reality since, as Sen recognizes, “extreme inequalities 
in matters of race, gender, and class often survive on the implicit 
understanding…that “there is no alternative.”39 Hence the aim 
becomes to provide alternatives, namely, the affordance of 
different individual life possibilities, despite the fact that in reality, 
“the capabilities that a person does actually have (and not merely 
theoretically enjoys) depend on the nature of social arrangements, 
which can be crucial for individual freedoms. And there the state 
and the society cannot escape responsibility.”40
 
35   Alkire, 2002:6; Sen 1992:40.
36   Sagovsky, 2006:70.
37   Alkire, 2002:170. italics in original. 
38   Alkire, 2002:172.
39   Sen, 1999:287.
40   Sen, 1999:288.
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3. CAPABILITY APPROACH: ASSESSMENT AND CRITIQUE
The capability approach has much explanatory power, both in 
theoretical and applied terms. Bonvin and Farvaque see it as, “a 
framework that may be used, both in practice and normatively, 
to assess issues related to living standards, poverty, quality of 
life, well-being, or agency. It encompasses both the assessment 
of individual situations, trajectories and potentialities, and the 
efficiency and fairness of social structures and arrangements. Its 
potential reach is thus very large.”41 
Indeed, the CA has already started to show its profound influence. 
Deneulin et al note that within two decades it has become, “a 
hugely influential theory for international social justice.”42 It shows 
itself in the annual Human Development Report, published by the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) since 1990, which 
focuses on the furtherance of capabilities at national and regional 
levels, with more than 120 such reports having been commissioned 
by various social/developmental organizations. 
Despite these successes, however, the question put to Sen and 
colleagues is: “does the capability approach address sufficiently the 
extent to which lack of human flourishing can be attributed to unjust 
social, political and economic structures and can it be deployed to 
bring about their transformation?”43 Deneulin and colleagues argue 
that notwithstanding its successes, this approach “overlooks two 
elements that are crucial to engagement with questions of structural 
injustice: human sociality and human fallibility. To speak about 
“unjust structures” is to see such structures, which are necessary 
expressions of human sociality, as marked by human finitude and 
fallibility”.44 
While Sen notes that “Individual freedom is quintessentially 
a social product…and there is a two-way relation between 
41   Bonvin & Farvaque, 2006:123.
42   Deneulin et al. 2006:2.
43   Deneulin et al., 2006:3.
44   Deneulin et al., 2006:3.
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social arrangements and individual freedoms”,45 he has been 
criticized for not being sufficiently socially-oriented in his thinking. 
The need thus arises for the ‘necessary thickening’ of Sen’s 
approach to development with a “vision of what is lacking in 
human relationships.”46 As Deneulin recognizes, “Despite the 
importance that the capability approach gives to the deep social 
relationships that link individuals together, despite the crucial role 
of social arrangements in the construction of individual freedoms 
themselves, Sen is very reluctant to approach development with a 
supra-individual subject.”47
This shortcoming, as we shall see, is itself significant and requires 
prompt attention; this will turn out to be the case especially since 
the person, as we shall define and discuss her to be, is supra-
individual in her constitution. Before we advance those ideas, 
however, we need to attend to the remaining critique of the implicit 
‘individualism’ in the CA and the swing to the supposedly opposite 
pole: that of the social. 
Sagovsky, for example, is of the opinion that, “Sen’s focus on 
individual human flourishing is supported by a less than adequate 
account of social flourishing…his thought can fruitfully be 
complemented by that of thinkers for whom the social matrix of 
individual human flourishing is something to be considered and 
assessed in its own right.”48 He suggests that Sen’s formulation of 
capability is ‘individualistic’, namely that it refers to functionings of 
reasonable individual value. Moreover, as he points out, “There are, 
however, ‘doings and beings’- and there are reasons- which pertain 
more to a society than an individual and some resources which 
pertain only to a society, but to which an individual gets access 
through membership of that particular society.”49
45   Sen, 1999:31.
46   Deneulin, 2006:33.
47   Deneulin, 2006:35.
48   Sagovsky, 2006:63.
49   Sagovsky, 2006:76.
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Bearing this in mind, Sagovsky calls for an ‘assessment’ of ‘the 
capability of a society’. He conceives of this as “the ability of that 
society to sustain the institutions and practices which make for 
individual flourishing”, concluding that “the necessary, dialogical 
critique of unjust structures can usefully be seen as an exercise not 
only of individual but also of ‘social capability’.”50 
If we attend to the deficit of the CA in the social domain, of course 
it becomes apparent that the social context requires attention, both 
in terms of relations and structures, which combine to form the 
matrix in which individual human actors live. For this reason, an 
explosion of interest occurred in the social capital approach during 
the new millennium, especially as Robert Putnam popularized 
it. This approach too requires some glossing if we are to tackle 
effectively the issue at hand. 
4. SOCIAL CAPITAL: ROBERT PUTNAM AND DECLINING 
COMMUNITY
Putnam is concerned with what he considers to be the relatively 
recent decline in ‘community bonds’ in the USA, especially 
given that he prides American society for being a participatory 
democracy.51 In an attempt to analyse this phenomenon, he turns 
to social capital and proposes that its core idea is as follows: 
“social networks have value. Just as a screwdriver (physical capital) 
or a college education (human capital) can increase productivity 
(both individual and collective), so too social contacts affect the 
productivity of individuals and groups.”52 Accordingly, he defines 
social capital as “connections among individuals- social networks 
and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from 
them. In that sense social capital is closely related to what some 
have called ‘civic virtue’ [which] …is most powerful when embedded 
in a dense network of reciprocal social relations.”53 
50   Sagovsky, 2006:78.
51   See Putnam, 2000:24.
52   Putnam, 2000:19.
53   Putnam, 2000:19.
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There are problems with Putnam’s overarching approach, however. 
Mclean et al. question “the viability of Putnam’s understanding of 
forces affecting civic engagement and the role of the individual in the 
democratic state, suggesting that his discussion of social capital is 
theoretically deficient on many fronts.” Their consensus, however, 
is that “civic engagement in America has declined and that there 
is reason to be concerned.”54 Given Putnam’s own interpretation 
of social capital as being used towards individually advantageous 
ends, manipulatively or not, he seems to stray, paradoxically, 
from the domain of the social in social capital to an individualistic 
perspective. 
This interpretation appears to be far removed the actual context of 
his original fieldwork observations undertaken in the Mediterranean, 
in which communities the social relations served both a communal 
and personal purpose. In this regard, there are perhaps other, more 
appealing definitions of social capital. Pierre Bourdieu, for one, 
defines social capital as “the aggregate of the actual or potential 
resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of 
more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance 
and recognition.”55 
Huysman and Wulf, building onto this definition, extend it helpfully 
as follows: “Social capital refers to network ties of goodwill, 
mutual support, shared language, shared norms, social trust, and 
a sense of mutual obligation that people can derive value from. 
It is understood as the glue that holds together social aggregates 
such as networks of personal relationships, communities, regions, 
or even whole nations.”56 
They make the very valid point that social capital refers to “the 
value derived from being a member of a society or community. 
By being a member, people have access to resources that are not 
54   Mclean et al. 2002. Social capital : critical perspectives on community and 
“Bowling alone”. (S.L. McLean, D.A. Schultz & M.B. Steger. New York: New 
York University Press. 14. 
55   Bourdieu, 1985:248.
56   Huysman & Wulf, 2004:1.
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available to non-members.”57 This notion is critical for our topic, 
since immigrant and ethnic minorities generally do not have the 
requisite resources upon their arrival or in the period thereafter to 
be held in their host community; they still need the ‘social’ glue that 
is required for them to adhere to their new social aggregate. For 
this reason, both forms of social capital are neeed: bonding capital 
within their own communities and bridging capital with members of 
their new society. 
It is precisely at this juncture that we can introduce ICT into the 
discussion; for as Putnam himself recognises, “Communication is 
a fundamental prerequisite for social and emotional connections…
Social capital is about networks, and the Net is the network to end 
all networks.”58 
5. SOCIAL CAPITAL AND ICT
While several recent authors suggest that the relationship between 
social capital and IT is ambivalent, transforming, diminishing or 
supplementing social capital,59 most researchers believe that it 
works complementarily, “positively influencing social capital.”60 
Indeed, it appears as if technological development and innovation 
are related to the changes that can be observed in the socialisation 
patterns of human persons. These changes in turn call for the need 
to devise fresh conceptions of community. 
Given emergent technologies, contemporary socialising is no 
longer bound to physical neighbourhoods, leading Quan-Haase 
& Wellman to suggest that “useful approaches define community 
not in terms of locality but as social networks of interpersonal ties 
that provide sociability, support, information, a sense of belonging 
and social identity.”61 They argue that “transformations in the 
57    Huysman & Wulf, 2004:1.
58    Putnam, 2000:170.
59    Quan-Haase & Wellman, 2004:116.
60   Huysman & Wulf, 2004:8.
61   Quan-Haase & Wellman, 2004:115.
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expression of community are related to the development and use 
of technologies.”62
Concerning the use of ICT to sustain and enhance interpersonal 
well-being, Putnam notes (albeit with the respect to the 
conventional telephone), “many observers have theorized that the 
telephone fostered ‘psychological neighbourhoods’, liberating our 
intimate social networks from the constraints of physical space.”63 
Furthermore, paradoxically on his account, “the telephone seems 
to have had the effect of reinforcing, not transforming or replacing, 
existing personal networks”,64 which seems to be a similar 
phenomenon to that which we are currently experiencing with the 
internet and mobile telephony. 
Putnam, however, seems perplexed by the relationship between 
ICT and social capital. He puzzles over “One central question…
whether ‘virtual social capital’ is itself a contradiction in terms…
very few things can be said with any confidence about the 
connection between social capital and internet technology. One 
truism, however, is this: the timing of the internet explosion means 
that it cannot possibly be causally linked to the crumbling of social 
connectedness.”65
This is clearly open to debate. First of all, many statements can 
be made concerning ICT and social capital. We know that these 
technologies enhance communication possibilities and make 
possible a boom in information, which usually plays out within a 
social context. Next, it may be in an effort to preserve or afford social 
connectedness, which, due to a combination of economic pressures 
and geographical separation, may otherwise be comprised that ICT 
shows its value. Hence, his ‘tougher question’, “whether that flow 
of information itself fosters social capital and genuine community…
information needs a social context”,66 is striking as far as for us the 
context is glaringly obvious.
62   Quan-Haase & Wellman, 2004:115.
63   Putnam, 2000:168.
64   Putnam, 2000:168.
65   Putnam, 2000:170.
66   Putnam, 2000:172.
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Finally, Putnam proposes that, “social capital may turn out to be a 
prerequisite for, rather than a consequence of, effective computer-
mediated communication.”67 In contrast, as Quan-Haase and 
Wellman note that “The internet makes it necessary to redefine 
our understanding of what social capital is. We believe that the 
Internet will intensify the interpersonal transformation from “door-
to-door” to “place-to-place” and individualised “person-to-person” 
networks.”68
Whilst we hope for a positive transformation of interpersonal 
relationships, we need to remain aware of the ‘darker sides’ of 
social capital. Huysman and Wulf note that due to the digital divide, 
separating those with access from those without, “IT is able to 
connect people, but at the same time it contributes to depriving 
those who are not connected.”69 Moreover, not all internet activity 
is social; besides using it to communicate, people also use it to 
engage in solitary or potentially isolated, individualistic activities. 
On the whole, however, the majority of evidence suggests that, “the 
internet adds on to existing patterns of communication…e-mail 
appears to support existing social contact, yet it does not become 
a substitute for phone and face-to-face communication.”70 
Quan-Haase and Wellman issue a note of caution that “not all uses 
of the internet are predictable. The internet may not affect social 
capital when it is used for one-to-one e-mail purposes, but it might 
affect it when used for other purposes such as virtual communities.”71 
On the contrary, it seems as if ICT can be used to further social 
capital via the establishment and maintenance of social networks 
on a one-to-one basis, since it facilitates or rather mediates such 
contact. Accordingly, those who can access the internet have been 
referred to as ‘glocalised’, that is to say, “involved in both local and 
long-distance relationships.”72
67   Putnam, 2000:177.
68   Quan-Haase & Wellman, 2004:126.
69   Huysman & Wulf, 2004:12.
70   Quan-Haase & Wellman, 2004:122.
71   Quan-Haase & Wellman, 2004:125.
72   Quan-Haase & Wellman, 2004:120.
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6. QUESTIONING RESEARCH APPROACHES TO SOCIAL 
CAPITAL 
In their analysis of social capital and ICT, Huysman and Wulf note 
that the major research activity is undertaken by “social, political, 
economic, or organisational scientists… although computer 
scientists and information system scholars are increasingly open to 
incorporating social science research into their discipline, and vice 
versa on the part of social scientists, cross-fertilization between 
the various research fields is still not standard practice.”73 For this 
reason, they advocate a more profound focus on “networks within 
and between organisations”, which in turn “makes research into the 
relationship between IT and social capital even more important.”74 
While the call for inter-disciplinarity is most welcome, we also need 
to call for a more integrated approach that does not purely focus on 
the ‘social’ domain when it comes to understanding ‘social capital’. 
In this regard, note that Huysman and Wulf point to the fact that 
all the contributions to their volume on social capital and IT “share 
an interest in communities as the social entities in which social 
capital resides”; hence they call for an analysis that advances a 
“sociotechnical research approach”.75 This is where one needs to 
intervene and ask about the pressing need to examine the personal 
domain, and with it, the interpersonal relations that make up the 
social capabilities of the community. We now need to illustrate this 
argument somewhat further, by referring to the approach to social 
capital adopted by sociologists and economists.
In making this comparison, Francois proposes, “Sociologists have 
long emphasized the role played by culture in facilitating economic 
interaction and recently economists and historians have joined 
in…although difficult to precisely define, the term social capital 
has been forwarded as a catch-all phrase to encompass the 
economically relevant aspects of culture.”76 However, the difference 
between the sociological approach, which considers types and the 
economic approach, which concentrates on incentives is significant 
73   Huysman & Wulf, 2004:7-8. 
74   Huysman & Wulf, 2004:8.
75   Huysman & Wulf, 2004:9.
76   Francois, 2002. Social capital and economic development. 6.
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when considering economic development. Whereas an economic 
approach will focus on price variation and public infrastructure, a 
concern with personality types aims to improve the nurturing of 
people, in the main through trustworthiness.77
Francois argues that whereas the economist sees the individual as 
“self-regarding, opportunistic and impervious to influence”, “it is still 
possible to generate actions which are other-regarding, and which 
correspond to what many have argued is an important component 
of social capital, trustworthiness.”78 However, this approach would 
utilize incentives, which needn’t require much deviation from the 
standard economic model, whereas the sociological interventions 
require that an emphasis is to be placed on the construction of 
the individual; which is a key difference. The role of psychology 
as a mediator in this spectrum of possibilities ought not to be 
underestimated. 
It is to this proposal that we now turn, in order to examine the 
potentially important contribution that cultural psychology has to 
offer, specifically as based upon a Vygotskian approach to mediated 
learning and proximal psycho-social development. 
7. THE CONTRIBUTION OF CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY: 
DEEP ONTOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS 
Bridget Somekh introduces cultural psychology as follows: “[it] 
is primarily focused on the development of mind through social 
interaction, following the Vygotskian concept of mediation of human 
actions…since the actions of individuals are always mediated 
by their interaction with others, the self is not a separate unique 
identity but a participant in the co-construction of discourses and 
social practices, essentially public rather than private”.79
Vygotsky recognized the convergence of language and action in 
human beings as representing “the most significant moment in the 
course of intellectual development”, observing that from our earliest 
77   See Francois, 2002:7.
78   Francois, 2002:13.
79   Somekh, 2007:12.
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development experiences, the child’s activities pass through another 
person.80 This led him to propose that our optimal development 
occurs only through other persons.81 But before we pursue this line 
of psycho-social development in relation to the topic at hand, it 
is necessary to expose our analytic reason for doing so. Briefly, 
the Vygotskian worldview fits very neatly with deeper philosophical 
views on social emergence and interpersonal ontology, which have 
been under development and integration elsewhere82 and which 
need to be introduced at this point.
In comparison with conventional ‘Western’ models that seek to 
polarise theoretical and practical emphases either on the ‘individual’ 
or on the ‘social’, alternative philosophies such as the sub-Saharan 
African ubuntu philosophy seek to emphasize relationality as key by 
synthesizing personal human relations within a communal context. 
The key maxim of ubuntu is that “a person is a person with other 
people”. 
Of course, this is not to suggest that European thought is devoid 
of reference to relationality; authors such as Hegel certainly have 
ruminated on this, albeit from a stricter ‘subject’/‘object’ divide. 
Likewise, Marx, in his thinking on social being is often thought to 
tend towards the collective but attention to his early writings still 
locates this within an individualistic perspective, namely, to social 
individuals. 
If, rather than considering human beings as isolated, atomised 
individuals, we opt for a position more aligned to ubuntu, namely 
that by our very definition as persons we ‘institute’, ‘constitute’ 
and sustain one another; then certain implications follow. For one, 
recognising that our actions influence the development and being of 
80  Lev Vygotsky, 1978:24, Mind in society. Harvard University Press: 
Cambridge, MA; 1986:30. Thought and language. Translated and edited by A. 
Kozulin. MIT Press: Cambridge, MA. 30.    
81   Vygotsky,1978.
82  See Alain Tschudin, 1998. Relative neocortex size and its correlates in 
dolphins: comparisons with humans and implications for mental evolution. 
Ph.D. Thesis, University of Natal; Tschudin, 2007. Being in communion and 
becoming reconciled: social evolution, interpersonal ontology and the ethics 
of relationality. Ph.D. Thesis. University of Cambridge. 
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other persons for better or worse places us in a greater position of 
ethical responsibility towards the other. Lévinas has suggested that 
the presence of the face of another instigates “entry into relation 
with me- the ethical relation”.83 
The philosophical school of ‘personalism’ draws its popular 
inspiration from naturalistic philosophies such as ubuntu and 
assumes that “the basic impulse in a world of persons is not the 
isolated perception of self (cogito) nor the egocentric concern for 
self, but the communication of consciousness…we should prefer 
to call it the communication of existence, existence with the other. 
Perhaps we should say co-existence (Mitsein).84 
 
This co-existence or relationality is essential to the personalist 
worldview. Martin Buber, remarking on this phenomenon with 
respect to the basic “I-You” relation notes that, “You has no borders. 
Whoever says You does not have something; he has nothing. But 
he stands in relation.”85 This relationality is central to our being 
and becoming, for as he notices, “All actual life is encounter”.86 
Hence, “whoever stands in relation, participates in actuality”.87 
John Macmurray, advancing the theme of relationality, notes 
that, “the personal relation of persons is constitutive of personal 
existence; that there can be no man until there are at least two men 
in communication.”88 
Macmurray’s core thesis, which we adopt and extend is that “the 
Self is constituted by its relation to the Other; that it has its being in 
its relationship; and that this relationship is necessarily personal.”89 
On this reading, any discussion of human ‘agency’ cannot focus on 
an individual, ‘isolated agent’, since this serves as a contradiction 
of terms, since we exist in relation with and to one another. For 
83   Lévinas,1969:181.
84   Mounier,1951. 
85   Buber,1970:55.
86   Buber,1970:62.
87    Buber,1970:113. 
88    Macmurray,1961:12.  
89    Macmurray,1961:17.
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Murray then, the unit of personal existence is, “that we are persons 
not by individual right, but in virtue of our relation to one another. 
The personal is constituted by personal relatedness. The unit of the 
personal is not the ‘I’, but the ‘You and I’.”90 
If we accept that interpersonal relationality is key to our personal 
being, then it follows, as the analytical philosopher Robert 
Spaemann notes, that, “Persons have one face, through which 
they point themselves out as persons to one another. Persons are 
persons for one another. Persons are only given in the plural.”91 
The personal domain then mediates between the individual and 
the social. To elaborate somewhat, it focuses on intersubjectivity, 
which is neglected both by the reduction of human being to the 
individual and by collectivist, totalitarian ideologies which dilute 
human existence to an amorphous mass. 
More than being ‘enacted’, however, these relations are ‘embodied’. 
To explicate this concern, dialogue can serve ‘as a principle of radical 
otherness’ or as Bakhtin suggests, it can “sustain and think through 
the radical exteriority or heterogeneity of one voice with regard to 
any other.”92 The interplay of dialogue and action, however, despite 
having been noted elsewhere, requires more thorough attention. 
Bakhtin writes: “Dialogue…is not the threshold to action, it is the 
action itself. It is not a means for revealing, for bringing to the 
surface the already-made character of a person… To be means to 
communicate dialogically. When dialogue ends, everything ends. 
Thus dialogue, by its very essence, cannot and must not come to 
an end…”93 As it has been noted elsewhere, “Being, as embodied 
relational activity, implies more than dialogue, which in the absence 
of action can fall into rhetoric.”94
One further step needs to be made. If we accept the fact that our 
constitution as persons is deeply interpersonal, we have already 
90    Macmurray,1961:61.
91   Spaemann,1996:144.
92   De Man,1989:109.
93   Bakhtin,1984:252.
94   Tschudin, 2007.
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moved into the philosophical territory of recognition. At its most 
elementary level, recognition is the “identification of any item as 
being itself and not anything else”;95 as we shall see subsequently, 
both capabilities and rights relate to recognition and especially so 
in the case of immigrants as ‘other’. For now, however, suffice it to 
note that our philosophical detour has been necessary, precisely 
to recognize the meaning of human being; having done so, we can 
better appreciate why Vygotsky’s focus on mediated activity is so 
crucial. 
8. DEVELOPMENT AS MEDIATED SOCIAL ACTIVITY 
Given our preferred orientation towards human being as personal 
being, which itself is contingent upon the nature of the interpersonal 
relations that we share, let us return to Vygotsky’s notion of higher 
cognitive functions. Indeed, on his reading, these functions initially 
manifest themselves externally, becoming internalised through 
the mediation of the cultural guide (usually the mother). Through 
mediation, therefore, the cultural ‘neophyte’ is able to enter into the 
zone of proximal development (ZPD), which can also be conceived 
of as “the range of possibility of achievement”.96 Bridget Somekh 
notes that, “The concept of development of mind through social 
interaction and, in particular the notion that students’ learning can 
be accelerated by providing support (or scaffolding, as Brunner 
termed it) within the ZPD, has been used extensively by innovatory 
programmes in education…some theorists go as far as to say that 
all communicative action (sign making) is a form of learning and all 
learning is transformative.”97
Given this phenomenon, Somekh suggests that “Socio-cultural 
understandings of identity support the notion of a confluence of the 
individual and the group.” She follows Wenger, who proposes that: 
“Building an identity consists of negotiating the meanings of our 
experience of membership in social communities. The concept of 
identity serves as a pivot between the social and the individual, so 
95   Ricoeur, 2006:1.
96   Somekh, 2007:14.
97   Somekh, 2007:14.
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that each can be talked about in terms of the other.”98 This sentiment 
combines very well with the notion of the sense of personal identity 
as mediating between the private and public worlds. 
Now, drawing our attention back to our contemporary milieu, 
however, we need to probe how current life and environmental 
circumstances impact on our social interactions and personal 
identities. Somekh argues that, “The changes in the way that 
knowledge is produced and communicated have dramatically 
shifted the social role of the learner. Drawing on the ideas of 
Vygotsky, it is clear that learning is a product of inter-relationships 
between learners and adults using cultural tools (both cognitive 
tools and artefacts).”99
In this regard, the key insight concerning modern technological 
innovation is contributed by Somekh: “how knowledge is constructed, 
stored, reported, accessed and used changes radically through 
using it (ICT) as a mediating tool in social practice.”100 In the light 
of this assertion, she suggests that the state must enable change 
proactively, by stimulating learning and facilitating education. She 
thus follows Ridgway and McCusker (2003) by proposing that in 
societies undergoing technological transformation, it is critical to: 
“map a new cognitive agenda, since cognitive abilities valued by 
one culture may be ‘rendered redundant by a new technology’”.101 
9. MAPPING A NEW COGNITIVE AGENDA WITH ICT?
Rather than perceiving ICT as a menace to our being, she argues that 
it allows our cognitive powers to become amplified, via an “effect 
with ICT”.102 In socio-cultural theory, ICT can “afford” development, 
especially when considered as a tool, with “latent possibilities for 
98   Somekh, 2007:16.
99   Sometkh, 2007:32.
100  Somekh, 2007:22.
101  Somekh, 2007:35.
102  Somekh, 2007:35.
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mediating human activity.”103 The overarching position concerning 
the relationship between ICT and social activity can be summarised 
in terms of development and capabilities, “the core insight [is] 
that there is the potential of expanding human capability through 
integrating ICT into action and co-creating new ICT-mediated 
practices.”104
The task for the remainder of our chapter precisely will be to focus 
on this insight, namely, how can ICT be appropriated by persons, 
in our case, by immigrants, to mediate their social activity, in order 
to facilitate their participation and integration. In the light of our 
interpersonal focus, we have to note that ICT cannot serve as a 
substitute for personal relations. Rather, it can foster what Putnam 
referred to earlier in the context of the telephone as ‘psychological 
neighbourhoods’. The maintenance of existing relations and the 
fostering of new relations are critical within the context of immigrants 
who are often faced with radically different life circumstances away 
from family, friends and social networks and who are at risk of 
alienation and ‘culture shock’.
Hence ICT can be used to nourish and transform what Quan-Haase 
and Wellman have termed “person-to-person” networks”, based 
on shared interest, rather than dependence upon geographical 
proximity, thus enabling people to become ‘glocalised’, that 
is, able to sustain both local and distant social interactions and 
relationships. 
Viewed from the perspective of the capability approach, the 
fostering of these life conditions are essential; ‘unfreedoms’ as Sen 
presents them, are not merely economic but social and political. 
As the CA promotes an interest in well-being through agency, we 
might consider that ICT serves precisely to provide alternatives to 
the status quo that there ‘is no alternative’. This appears to be true 
both with respect to facilitating communication and information 
exchanges, whether for occupational, health and safety or 
socialising purposes, amongst others. 
103   Somekh, 2007:12.
104   Somekh, 2007:3.
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In the light of our own presentation, however, we have suggested 
that more attention has been focused on the social domain, to the 
detriment of the personal. In the final part of this chapter, to further 
our discussion of the personal appropriation of ICT by immigrants, 
we need to consider the notion of integration in relation to trust and 
recognition, before turning to policy considerations. 
10. IMMIGRATION AND INTEGRATION
Ricard Morén-Alegret notes that, “the word ‘immigration’ is often 
uncritically linked to ‘integration’ issues, taking for granted that 
those who migrate always face more problems than the rest of 
the population…[h]owever…migration often serves as a front 
for other phenomena, and social conflicts that are considered to 
be associated with migration often conceal more fundamental 
conflicts.”105 
In exploring the notion of integration, Morén-Alegret provides a 
wide variety of definitional terms, citing with approval the distinction 
made by Durkheim concerning the two different forms of social 
integration, namely mechanical solidarity, that is, the attraction 
of like for like and organic solidarity, that is attraction organised 
according to complementary differences. 
As he recognises, both are necessary, as Durkheim suggested; 
namely organic solidarity (functional integration) is insufficient, a 
degree of mechanical solidarity (moral integration) is also required.106 
A fortiori, Sztompka recognises that “our world has become 
extremely interdependent. Within every society the differentiation 
and specialization of roles, functions, occupations, special interests, 
lifestyles, and tastes has reached immense proportions, rendering 
‘organic solidarity’ in the Durkheimian sense more imperative than 
ever.”107
105   Ricard Morén-Alegret, 2007:10. Globalisation, integration and 
resistance. 
106   Alegret, 2007:12.
107   Sztompka, 1999:12.
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Hence Morén-Alegret discerns three components to consider vis-
à-vis the integration of social reality: social integration (integration 
of society), systemic integration (integration of the system) and 
habitat or environmental integration (integration of the habitat). 
Changing the emphasis to integration in social reality foregrounds 
the social whole, while the institutional and physical aspects remain 
in the background.108 
On his reading, whereas social integration is direct and based 
on ‘communicative action’, systemic integration is mediated by 
the institutional ‘field’ and depends on ‘power and instrumental 
action’.109 Importantly, for our purposes, Alegret makes reference 
to Habermas’ ‘lifeworld’; conceived as supporting social and 
habitation integrations it is “not characterized by isolation but by 
being a place of socialization (thus to reach the latter, solidarity is 
necessary).”110 
This statement, and especially the fragment in parentheses, is 
central to the argument at hand, especially since we have elsewhere 
defined the primary virtue of interpersonal being as solidarity.111 
Viewed from the systemic perspective, however, “the system 
can also foster several divisions among people in order to better 
colonise the lifeworld. One of such possible divisions is based on 
the place of origin or nationality, in other words, the creation of 
categories like ‘immigrant’ or ‘foreigner’.”112 
Indeed, as he notes, “the concept ‘immigrant’ is a category without 
juridical translation. It is a demographic, geographical or socio-
geographic concept which defines those persons established in a 
place and whose origin is in another area, region, country, state, etc.”113
The profound insight here occurs in relation to social institutions, 
namely that, “associations or social organizations at a given moment 
108   Alegret, 2007:14.
109   Alegret, 2007:14.
110   Alegret, 2007:15.
111   See Tschudin, 2008.
112   Alegret, 2007:18.
113   Alegret, 2007:19.
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and in a given place can perform in a systemic way, supporting the 
rule of capital or becoming safety-valve institutions, but they can 
also act in a social way, supporting the improvement of people’s 
lives.”114 Regrettably, as Alegret has observed, contemporary life 
tends towards the former, namely, “social life has been losing 
ground in social organizations in favour of systemic processes 
(e.g. increasing provision of services instead of mutual help among 
members). Associations may be used by governments to alleviate 
or control social problems without being directly involved.”115
He concludes by returning to need for solidarity: “in post-fordist 
times, when systemic processes are boosted and social processes 
are weakened, mutual aid can be a way forward to improve peoples 
lives at a world level. From a geographical perspective, solidarity can 
be done locally, regionally, nationally, trans-nationally, continentally 
or globally (or at several scales at once), but unequal relations are a 
key issue to be addressed.”116
Indeed, in reflecting on the above collection of themes concerning 
participation and integration, we initially suggested that the 
capability approach held a potentially valuable contribution, with the 
qualification that more attention be paid to the social dimension of its 
application; likewise we proposed that social capital complements 
this approach very well, but only when greater attention is paid to 
the person. Given the traditional divide in approach between the 
sociological focus on social and its economic counterpart on the 
individual, we suggested that cultural psychology, which considers 
the individual in society, can serve as a valuable mediator. This 
was argued to be the case because of the deeply interpersonal 
underpinnings of human existence as personal being. We then 
proposed that ICT can serve as a mediator of social activity and 
as such, can boost personal capabilities and supplement social 
capital. 
114   Alegret, 2007:231.
115   Alegret, 2007:231.
116   Alegret, 2007:233.
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The utility of ICT is seemingly especially important for immigrants 
and ethnic minorities, in the light of the challenge of integration 
with which they are confronted. Yet, the face of the immigrant 
only represents one side of the coin, while the other is that of the 
host society, most notably through its social institutions. For this 
reason, we entertained the call for greater solidarity and a boosted 
inter-personal relationality, during times of impersonal systemic 
dominance. The question that remains and which begs an answer 
is, how exactly might such practices come into being and be 
sustained? The response begins with reference to trust. 
11. TRUST 
Piotr Sztompka defines trust as “a bet about the future contingent 
actions of others”, which involves beliefs and commitment; firstly 
specific (anticipatory) expectations and second, commitment 
through action.”117 He suggests that trust serves six primary 
functions: it is an important dimension of civic culture,118 of civic 
society; and implicitly, of cultural capital; it is crucial for social 
capital; linked to postmaterialist values and finally, it is necessary 
for civilizational competence.” Hence trust is a prerequisite for 
political participation, entrepreneurial efforts, readiness to embrace 
new technologies.”119 
As Sztompka notes, several ‘primary targets of trust’ exist. In his 
opinion, “The most fundamental are other persons (actors), fully-
fledged individuals with whom we come into direct contact…behind 
all other social objects, however complex, there also stand some 
people, and it is the people whom we ultimately endow with trust.”120 
With reference to Japanese ‘high-trust culture’, for example, he 
notes that it exists in “the visibility of every individual in the life-
world: in the family, at work, at leisure, and so on. To attain familiarity 
and visibility, a dense network of groups, communities, voluntary 
117   Sztompka, 1999:25-26.
118   Sztompka, 1999:14.
119   Sztompka, 1999:15.
120   Sztompla, 1999:41.
Gualda Caballero, Estrella (ed.) ; Inmigración, ciudadanía y gestión de la diversidad. 
© Universidad Internacional de Andalucía, 2011. 
179
associations and friendship circles, providing opportunities for 
personal contacts, seems necessary.”121
Trust is identified as integral for wider community flourishing, 
since, amongst others, it “encourages sociability, participation with 
others…it increases what Emile Durkheim called the ‘moral density’ 
and what modern authors describe as ‘social capital’…favours the 
spread of communication…encourages tolerance, acceptance 
of strangers, recognition of cultural or political differences as 
legitimate…strengthens the bond of an individual with the 
community, contributes to feelings of identity, and generates strong 
collective solidarities leading to cooperation, reciprocal help, and 
even the readiness for sacrifice on behalf of others…transaction 
costs are significantly lowered and chances for cooperation 
increased.”122
Distrust, on the other hand, “erodes social capital…closes channels 
of communications…mobilizes defensive attitudes…alienates and 
uproots an individual, expands toward interpersonal dealings as 
well as relations with outsiders…the transaction costs due to the 
necessity of constant vigilance are significantly raised and the 
chances of cooperation hindered.”123 
As Francois observes, regarding social capital, “A common feature 
to all positive definitions of social capital is an element of regard 
for others.”124 For him, trustworthiness and social capital are 
synonymous, whereas trusting “does not constitute the economy’s 
social capital, but is rather a reflection of it.”125 Hence, notably, if trust 
is the reflection of social capital, the underlying key to building up 
a ‘trust culture’, which Sztompka sees as “a product of history”,126 
comes through trustworthiness, or reliability. But with this turn, we 
have arrived back at the central significance of recognition, as the 
121   Sztompka, 1999:81.
122   Sztompka, 1999:105.
123    Sztompka, 1999:1105.
124    Francois, 2002:9.
125    Francois, 2002:10.
126    Sztompka, 1999:99.
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capability to make an identification of something or someone with 
a degree of certainty.
12. RETURNING TO RECOGNITION
In linking with our reflections on capabilities, Ricoeur arrives at 
the interesting ‘minimal’ definition of capability as “the power to 
cause something to happen ; it is this power that is liable to self 
recognition.”127 This notion ties in well with what Sen refers to 
as agency or participation. For Ricoeur, the first capability is the 
capacity for speech, followed by the capacity for action, with the 
third the capacity to tell or what he terms, narrative identity. He 
suggests that “to a large extent, what we call personal identity 
is linked to this capacity and may be characterised as narrative 
identity…[which] relies rather on the ongoing dialectic between idem 
and ipse identity, between sameness and selfhood…this dialectical 
constitution of personal identity…claims to be recognised at the 
level of juridical, social and political relationships.”128 
To this, Ricoeur adds a ‘complementary hypothesis’, which is 
necessary to permit “the transition from self recognition to mutual 
recognition”. It relies on the reversal of the verb use “to recognise” 
from the active to the passive voice. This reversal shifts the meaning 
from “the claim to recognise to the need to be recognised.” Such 
a process requires the constant mediation of institutions to ensure 
stability and durability through dynamic transitions. Simultaneously, 
as Ricoeur notes, “the category of alterity or otherness assumes 
the form of reciprocity or mutuality which was lacking- or remained 
implicit- at the previous stage of self-recognition in terms of 
capabilities.”129
Finally, in relation to alterity, he notes that there is “another dialectic 
than that of the idem and the ipse, the dialectic of identity confronted 
by otherness. The question of identity in this sense has two sides, 
127   Ricoeur, 2006:1.
128    Ricoeur, 2006:3.
129   Ricoeur, 2006:5.
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one public, and one private. The story of a life includes interactions 
with others…”130
For Ricoeur, the “small miracle of recognition” is that it resolves the 
“oldest enigma of the problematic of memory- that is, the present 
representation of something absent. Recognition is the effective 
resolution of this enigma of the presence of an absence, thanks to 
the certitude that accompanies it.”131 Interpreted with some licence, 
does not this also refer to trustworthiness, in the sense that I am 
able to rely on someone or something absent precisely because of 
the certainty of his or her presence? 
13. FINAL NOTE
According to Hellsten “Using a capability approach as a normative 
ethical framework for distribution and implementation of ICT means 
that we need to reconsider the role of ICT in relation to what people 
can do with the new technology or what the technology can do 
for them in different cultural, political and economic settings, and 
geographic or environmental conditions, rather than assume that 
technological development has some intrinsic value.”132
In this chapter we have reflected on the personal appropriation 
process of ICT using the concepts of capability and social capital. 
Then we have shown that cultural psychology serves as mediator 
between both approaches, interpreting then ICT as a mediator of 
social activity. Following this outline, we have tried to show the 
implications of a relational approach. These theoretical tools may 
help to understand the complexities of the personal appropriation 
of ICT by immigrants.
130    Ricoeur, 2005. The course of recognition. 103. 
131   Ricoeur, 2005:124-5.
132   Hellsten, (2007:4).
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